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Abstract. We study the market selection hypothesis in complete financial
markets, populated by heterogeneous agents. We allow for a rich structure of
heterogeneity: individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning the economy,
information and learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience and ’catching
up with Joneses’ preferences. We develop new techniques for studying the
long-run behavior of such economies, based on the Strassen’s functional law of
iterated logarithm. In particular, we explicitly determine an agent’s survival
index and show how the latter depends on the agent’s characteristics. We use
these results to study the long-run behavior of the equilibrium interest rate
and the market price of risk.
1. Introduction
A fundamental question in the modern theory of financial economics is concerned
with the so-called market selection hypothesis, dating back to the ideas of Fried-
man [16]. Motivated by the postulate that agents with inaccurate forecasts will
eventually be driven out of the economy, this hypothesis can be stated informally
as ”If you are so smart, why aren’t you rich?”. Formally, market selection in finan-
cial markets examines the agents’ long-run survival1 capability and price impact in
equilibrium models. There is a vast body of literature dealing with this topic; see
e.g. Blume and Easley [7], Cvitanic´, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8], Nishide and
Rogers [25], Sandroni [27], and Yan [32, 33].
This paper investigates the market selection hypothesis (or, natural selection, for
short) and the long-run behavior of asset prices in a complete market setting with
highly heterogeneous investors. Individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning
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1An agent is said to survive in the long-run if the ratio of his consumption to the aggregate
consumption stays positive with positive probability as time goes to infinity.
1
2 R. Muraviev
the economy, information and learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience (time
preference rate) and degree of habit-formation. Each individual in our model is rep-
resented by a generalized version of the catching up with the Joneses power utility
function of Chan and Kogan [9]. This model of preferences is sometimes referred to
in the literature as exogenous habit-formation, since it incorporates the impact of a
certain given stochastic process on the individual’s consumption policy. Agents are
assumed to possess only partial information regarding the events associated with
the evolution of the market. More precisely, the stochastic dynamics of the mean
growth-rate of the economy2 are unobservable, and the agents’ information set con-
sists of the aggregate endowment and a publicly observable signal. Furthermore,
agents are allowed to have diverse beliefs concerning the values of the initial and
average mean growth-rate. Individuals may be irrational in the way they interpret
the public signal: some of them may be over- (or, under-)confident about the in-
formativeness of the public signal. We use the standard way of modeling over-(or,
under-)confidence, originated in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal [14] and Scheinkman
and Xiong [28]: we assume that agents’ beliefs concerning the instantaneous corre-
lation of the public signal with the economy’s growth-rate may differ from its actual
value.3 The agents are rational in the sense that they use a standard Kalman filter
to update their expectations about the economy’s growth-rate. The heterogeneous
filtering rules yield highly non-trivial dynamics for the individual consumption and
the equilibrium state price density, determined by the market clearing condition. In
particular, subjective probability densities describing the agents’ beliefs give rise to
multiple new state variables, which govern the dynamics of the economy. We refer
to Back [2] for a survey on filtering and incomplete information in asset pricing
theory.
Let us describe the contribution of this work to the literature on equilibrium and
natural selection. Firstly, as described above, we analyze a very general paradigm of
heterogeneous economies including diverse beliefs, Kalman filtering and exogenous
state-dependent habit formation preferences. We provide a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the equilibrium characteristics, that can be used for further research in other
possible directions. Secondly, this complex setting in turn allows detecting which
traits (both behavioral-preferential and information-related) are beneficial for sur-
vival. That is, as in Yan [32], we reveal that there is a unique surviving agent in
the long-run. Moreover, we show that the interest rate and the market price of risk
behave asymptotically as those of an economy, populated solely by this surviving
agent. Lastly, to derive our results, we develop new techniques based mainly on
the Strassen’s functional law of iterated logarithm. To the best of our knowledge,
these methods have never been used in the general equilibrium literature before.
2We assume that the mean growth-rate follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
3This is a realistic assumption as correlations are extremely difficult to estimate empirically.
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The conclusions and implications on natural selection are as follows. Most im-
portantly, our findings indeed confirm, to a large extent, the validity of the market
selection hypothesis.
In a growing economy, the less effectively risk-averse4 agent is the one to survive
in the long-run. This result is consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Cvitanic´,
Jouini, Malamud, and Napp [8]). However, the impact of habit-formation on the
effective risk aversion, and thus in particular on survival, is quite novel. As it
turns out, if the (standard non-effective) risk aversion coefficient is above one, then
the individual with the strongest habit will survive. Intuitively, this makes sense,
as aggressiveness in a growing economy among somewhat moderate individuals is
supposed to be a plus. On the other hand, if the (standard non-effective) level
of risk aversion is below one (i.e., individuals are relatively risk-seeking in the
classical sense), the agent with the lowest degree of habit-formation will dominate.
This is not surprising at all, as excess aggressiveness can cause bubbles leading to
extinction.
Some of our conclusions concerning the interaction of diverse beliefs and survival
are quite intriguing, and seem to be quite hard to predict without a delicate analysis.
When agents differ only in their beliefs concerning the average mean growth-rate,
the one with the most accurate forecast will dominate the market, as expected. If all
agents are over-confident (or under-confident), then, again, the agent with the best
guess will beat the others. However, if some agents are over-confident and others
are under-confident, the situation is more complex. For instance, it may happen
that in a situation where the public signal provides some relevant information about
the market, the surviving agent will be the one who (wrongly) believes that this
signal is a pure noise, whereas the agent who is significantly overconfident in the
informativeness of the signal will be eliminated from the economy. Furthermore, in
some cases, agents that believe in a negative correlation of the signal will survive,
while individuals who believe in a (too high) positive correlation will be extinct,
despite an actual positive correlation. See Figure 1 for an example describing these
phenomena. Even though it is somewhat debatable which property of the preceding
two can be considered a more rational one, we still learn that theoretically, the
market selection hypothesis is valid, at least in some modified form.
We now review some related works. The most closely related to ours are the pa-
pers by Yan [32] and Cvitanic´, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8].5 Specifically, these
authors consider a special case of our model corresponding to the case when there
is no learning and agents having standard CRRA preferences without any habit
formation. In terms of modeling heterogeneous beliefs and learning, our model
4In our model, the effective risk aversion depends on the level of habit-formation (see (4.2))
5Bhamra and Uppal [5], Dumas [13], and Wang [29] considered the same model, but with only
two agent types and heterogeneity coming only from risk aversion.
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closely follows the one of Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal [14] and Scheinkman and
Xiong [28], who considered a special case of our model: a two-agent economy with
standard CRRA utility functions, and the public signal being a pure noise, uncor-
related with the economy’s growth-rate. Chan and Kogan [9] consider a special
case of our model with homogeneous ’catching up with the Joneses’ habit levels
and a continuum of agents with heterogeneous risk aversions. Xiouros and Zapa-
tero [31] derive a closed form expression for the equilibrium state price density in
the Chan and Kogan [9] model. Cvitanic´ and Malamud [10] study how long-run
risk sharing depends on the presence of multiple agents with different levels of risk
aversion. Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield [21] and Cvitanic´ and Malamud [11]
study the interaction of survival and price impact in economies where agents derive
utility only from terminal consumption. Fedyk, Heyerdahl-Larsen and Walden [15]
extend the model of Yan [32] by allowing for many assets. Kogan, Ross, Wang and
Westerfield [22] study the link between survival and price impact in the presence of
intermediate consumption, and allow for general utilities with unbounded relative
risk aversion and a general dividend process. Another quite significant direction of
the complete market risk sharing literature concentrates on the equilibrium effects
of heterogeneous beliefs. Bhamra and Uppal [6] derive a characterization of the
equilibrium state price density by means of infinite series that admits a closed form
solution for specific coefficients, in a two-agent economy with diverse beliefs and
heterogenous CRRA preferences. With CRRA agents differing only in their beliefs,
the equilibrium state price density can be derived in a closed form, and thus many
equilibrium properties can be analyzed in detail. See, e.g., Basak [3, 4], Jouini and
Napp [19, 20], Jouini, Martin and Napp [18] and Xiong and Yan [30].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
provide some preliminary results. Section 3 is devoted to a brief description of
the equilibrium state price density in homogeneous and heterogeneous settings. In
Section 4, we present the main result of the paper and discuss some implications.
Section 5 deals with some auxiliary results that are crucial for the proof of the main
result. In Section 6 we prove the main result. Finally, in Section 7 we establish
long-run results for the interest rate and the market price of risk. Some of the
results appearing in sections 5 and 7 are of an independent mathematical interest.
2. Preliminaries
We consider a continuous-time Arrow-Debreu economy with an infinite hori-
zon, in which heterogeneous agents maximize their utility functions from consump-
tion. The uncertainty in our model is captured by a (complete) probability space
(Ω,F∞, P ) and a continuous filtration F := (Ft)t∈[0,∞), with F0 = {∅,Ω}. We fix
three standard and independent Wiener processes (W
(i)
t )t∈[0,∞), i = 1, 2, 3, adapted
to the filtration F . There are N different types of agents in the economy, labeled
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by i = 1, ..., N. Each agent i is equipped with a non-negative endowment process(
ǫit
)
t∈[0,∞) adapted to the filtration G (see (2.7)). We denote by Dt :=
∑N
i=1 ǫ
i
t the
aggregate endowment process and assume that (Dt)t∈[0,∞) satisfies
(2.1)
dDt
Dt
= µDt dt+ σ
DdW
(1)
t , D0 = 1,
or equivalently
(2.2) Dt = exp
(∫ t
0
µDs ds−
1
2
(σD)2t+ σDW
(1)
t
)
,
where the constant σD > 0 represents the volatility. Themean growth-rate (µDt )t∈[0,∞)
is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that solves uniquely the SDE
(2.3) dµDt = −ξ(µDt − µ)dt+ σµdW (2)t , µD0 = µ,
that is
(2.4) µDt = µ+ (µ0 − µ) e−ξt + σµe−ξt
∫ t
0
eξsdW (2)s ,
where µ, µ0 and σ
µ are some real numbers and ξ > 0. The numbers µ, µ0 will be
referred to as the average and initial mean growth-rate, respectively.
2.1. The Financial Market. We consider a financial market that consists of
at least two long-lived securities: a risky stock (St)t∈[0,∞) and a bank account
(S0t )t∈[0,∞). In addition to this, there are other (not explicitly modeled) assets guar-
anteeing that the market is dynamically complete6 for G adapted claims (where the
filtration G := (Gt)t∈[0,∞) is defined in (2.7)). We emphasize that this filtration co-
incides with the symmetric information shared by all agents. The bond is in zero net
supply and the stock is a claim to the total endowment of the economy (Dt)t∈[0,∞)
and has a net supply of one share. The risk-less bond is given by S0t = e
∫
t
0
rsds,
where (rt)t∈[0,∞) is the risk-free rate process. We assume a unique positive state
price density denoted by (Mt)t∈[0,∞), that is, a positive adapted process to G that
satisfies
Mt = E
[
e
∫
u
t
rsdsMu
∣∣Gt] ,
for all u > t, and
St = E
[∫ ∞
t
Mu
Mt
Dudu
∣∣Gt] ,
6 In this setting, the model can be implemented by a complete securities market with a unique
state price density derived in equilibrium (as for instance in Duffie and Huang [12]). More specif-
ically, the filtration G is generated by the Brownian motion st (which is interpreted as a public
signal) and the aggregate endowment process Dt. Nevertheless, as explained in Remark 2.2, the
filtration G is also generated by the Brownian motions st and W
(0)
t . Thereby, the market can
be completed by adding one additional security to St. However, since the price of this security
would be determined endogenously, one would have to verify endogenous completeness. This can
be done by using the techniques of Hugonnier, Malamud and Trubowitz [17]. Otherwise, we can
just assume that there are sufficiently many (derivative) assets, completing the market.
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for all t > 0. Note that our assumption excludes arbitrage opportunities in the
model. The state price density, as well as all other parameters, are to be derived
endogenously in equilibrium.
2.2. Preferences and Equilibrium. Agent i is maximizing his intertemporal von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
sup
(cit)t∈[0,∞)
EP
i
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρitUi(cit)dt
]
,
from consumption, under the constraints that the consumption stream (cit)t∈[0,∞)
is a positive process adapted to G (which is defined in (2.7)) and lies in the budget
set
E
[∫ ∞
0
citMtdt
]
≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
ǫitMtdt
]
.
Here, EPi [·] stands for the expectation with respect to the subjective probability
measure Pi of agent i. The exact form of Pi is specified in (2.15). We assume that
all agents are represented by ’catching up with the Joneses7’ preferences:
Ui (cit) =
1
1− γi
(
cit
Hit
)1−γi
.
The subjective ’standard of living’ index (Hit)t∈[0,∞) is defined through a certain
geometric average of the aggregate endowment process. We consider here a more
general specification for Hit than the one in Chan and Kogan [9]. Namely, we set
Hit = e
βixt , for some βi ≥ 0, where
(2.5) xt = e
−λt
(
x0 + λ
∫ t
0
eλs log(Ds)ds
)
,
or equivalently, (xt)t∈[0,∞) solves the SDE
dxt = λ(log(Dt)− xt)dt.
For each agent i, the number βi measures the impact of the index xt on the agent;
in particular, when βi = 0, the agent is not influenced by the index at all. For large
βi, the influence is somewhat heavy. In complete markets, the optimal consumption
stream can be easily derived as in the following statement.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal consumption stream of agent i, in a complete mar-
ket represented by a state price density (Mt)t∈[0,∞), is given by
cit = e
ρi
γi
t
M
− 1γi
t Z
1
γi
it H
γi−1
γi
it ci0,
and
E
[∫ ∞
0
citξt
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
ǫitMt
]
,
7This paradigm of a utility function was first introduced in Abel [1], and is commonly referred
to in the literature as a utility with exogenous habits. This specification describes a decision
maker who experiences an impact of the ’standard of living’ index.
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where the density process (Zit)t∈[0,∞) is given in (2.15).
Proof. The assertion follows by standard duality arguments involving the first-
order conditions. 
Finally, we introduce the notion of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. An equilibrium is a pair
(
(cit)t∈[0,∞), (Mt)t∈[0,∞)
)
such that:
a. Each process (cit)t∈[0,∞) is the optimal consumption stream of agent i and
(Mt)t∈[0,∞) is the state price density that represents the market.
b. The market clearing condition is satisfied:
(2.6)
N∑
i=1
cit = Dt,
for all t > 0.
2.3. Diverse Beliefs and Learning. The are two processes in the economy that
are observable by all agents. The first one is the aggregate endowment process
(Dt)t∈[0,∞), and the second one is a certain public signal
st = φW
(2)
t +
√
1− φ2W (3)t ,
for some φ ∈ [0, 1). That is, the public signal exhibits a non-negative correlation φ ∈
[0, 1) with the shock governing the mean growth-rate process. The corresponding
filtration is denoted by
(2.7) Gt := σ
(
{su;u ≤ t}
⋃
{Du;u ≤ t}
)
.
In contrast to this, the mean growth-rate process is unobservable. That is, neither
of the agents possesses access to the data revealing the dynamics of the process
(µDt )t∈[0,∞). Furthermore, agents may have diverse beliefs concerning the average
and initial mean growth-rate. More precisely, each agent i believes that the initial
mean growth-rate is some µ0i ∈ R and that the average mean growth-rate is some
µi ∈ R. That is to say, before filtering, agent i assigns in his mind the following
model for µDt :
(2.8) µi + (µi0 − µi) e−ξt + σµe−ξt
∫ t
0
eξsdW (2)s .
Furthermore, individuals may have an irrational perception of the signal. Con-
cretely, each agent i believes that the public signal (st)t∈[0,∞) has a correlation
φi ∈ [−1, 1) with (W (2)t )t∈[0,∞), when if fact, the correlation is φ ∈ [0, 1). There-
fore, under the belief of agent i, the following model is attributed to the signal
st:
(2.9) φiW
(2)
t +
√
1− φ2iW (3)t .
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We denote by Qi the measure corresponding to agent’s i−th beliefs regarding the
models in (2.8) and (2.9), where W
(1)
t ,W
(2)
t and W
(3)
t are independent Wiener
processes under Qi. Consequently, agents are in the process of learning and filtering
out the dynamics of the mean growth-rate, which is deduced by using the theory
of optimal filtering.
Definition 2.2. The process
µDit := E
Qi
[
µi + (µi0 − µi) e−ξt + σµe−ξt
∫ t
0
eξsdW (2)s
∣∣Gt]
is called the subjective mean growth-rate of agent i.
Proposition 2.2. We have
(2.10) µDit =
µi0
yit
+
ξµi
yit
∫ t
0
yiudu+
1
(σD)
2
yit
∫ t
0
νiuyiu
Du
dDu +
σµφi
yit
∫ t
0
yiudsu,
where
(2.11) yit = exp
(
ξt+
1
(σD)2
∫ t
0
νisds
)
,
and the variance process
νit := E
Qi
[(
µDt − EQ
i [
µDt
∣∣Gt])2 ∣∣Gt]
is deterministic and given by
(2.12) νit = αi2(σ
D)2
e(αi2−αi1)t − 1
e(αi2−αi1)t − αi2/αi1 ,
where
αi2 =
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)2(1− φ2i )− ξ,
and
αi1 = −
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)2(1 − φ2i )− ξ.
Proof. Observe that Theorem 12.7 in Liptser and Shiryaev [24] implies that(
µDit
)
t∈[0,∞) satisfies the following SDE
(2.13) dµDit = −ξ
(
µDit − µi
)
dt+
νit
(σD)
2
(
dDt
Dt
− µDitdt
)
+ σµφidst,
where the variance process νit is detected through the following Riccati ODE
ν′it = −2ξνit + (σµ)2
(
1− φ2i
)− 1
(σD)2
ν2it,
with νi0 = 0. One can solve the above equation and verify that νit is given by (2.12).
Now, we shall solve the SDE (2.13). By definition, we have y′it = (ξ +
νit
(σD)2 )yit,
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and yi0 = 1. Notice that the preceding observation combined with Ito’s formula
implies that
d
(
yitµ
D
it
)
= ξµiyitdt+
νit
(σD)
2 yit
dDt
Dt
+ σµφiyitdst,
completing the proof. 
Remark 2.1. Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal [14] consider the static version of (2.10).
That is, the functions νit and yit are substituted by the corresponding asymptotic
limits. This can be justified by Lemma 5.3 of the current paper.
We denote by i = 0 a fictional agent who is rational in the sense that he knows
the correct average, initial mean growth-rate and the correlation parameter φ. Let
us denote by µD0t := E
P
[
µDt
∣∣Gt] the estimated mean growth-rate of this agent. As
in Proposition 2.2, we have
µD0t =
µ0
y0t
+
ξµ
y0t
∫ t
0
y0udu +
1
(σD)
2
y0t
∫ t
0
ν0uy0u
Du
dDu +
σµφ
y0t
∫ t
0
y0udsu,
where y0t and ν0t are defined similarly to (2.11) and (2.12). It can be shown, as
in Theorem 8.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev [23], that W
(0)
t =W
(1)
t −
∫ t
0
µD0s−µDs
σD ds is a
P−Brownian motion with respect to the filtration G.
Remark 2.2. The filtration G is generated by the public signal st and the Brownian
motion W
(0)
t . To see this, note that
dDt
Dt
= µD0tdt+ σ
DdW
(0)
t ,
and
dµD0t = −ξ
(
µD0t − µ
)
dt+
ν0t
σD
dW
(0)
t + σ
µφdst.
We set
(2.14) δit :=
µDit − µD0t
σD
to be the i−th agent’s error in the mean growth-rate estimation. The dynamics of
(Dt)t∈[0,∞) from the i−th agent’s perspective admit the form
dDt
Dt
= µDitdt+ σ
DdW
(0)
it ,
where
dW
(0)
it = dW
(0)
t − δitdt
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is a Brownian motion (by Girsanov’s theorem) under the equivalent probability
measure8 Pi and the filtration G, where
(2.15) Zit := E
[
dP i
dP
∣∣Gt] = exp(∫ t
0
δisdW
(0)
s −
1
2
∫ t
0
δ2isds
)
.
Let us stress that W
(0)
it is also a Q
i−Brownian motion with respect to the filtration
G. In particular, this implies that by restricting the measureQi to the sigma-algebra
generated by W
(0)
it , we get the measure P
i. Nevertheless, the measures Qi and P
(the physical probability measure) are singular on the sigma-algebra (see (2.8) and
(2.9)) generated by the Brownian motions W
(1)
t ,W
(2)
t and W
(3)
t .
3. The Equilibrium State Price Density
In the current section we depict the structure of the equilibrium state price
density in both settings of homogeneous and heterogeneous economies.
3.1. Homogeneous Economy. Consider an economy where all agents are of the
same type i, and denote by (Mit)t∈[0,∞) the corresponding equilibrium state price
density. The homogeneity of the economy combined with the completeness of the
market allows to derive the corresponding state price density in a closed form.
Lemma 3.1. The equilibrium state price density in a market populated by one
agent of type i is given by
(3.1) Mit = e
−ρitD−γit ZitH
γi−1
it =
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(
ρi + γi
(
µD0s −
1
2
(σD)2
)
+
1
2
δ2is
)
ds
)
×
exp
(
(γi − 1)βixt +
∫ t
0
(
δis − γiσD
)
dW (0)s
)
.
Proof. The assertion follows by using the market clearing condition and Lemma
2.1. 
We derive next the risk free-rate and the market price of risk in a homogeneous
economy.
Lemma 3.2. The risk free rate and the market price of risk in an economy popu-
lated by one agent of type i, are given respectively by
rit := ρi + γiµ
D
it −
1
2
(
σD
)2
γi (γi + 1)− βi (γi − 1) (xt − log (Dt))
and
θit := γiσ
D − δit.
8One can check that the process (Zit)t∈[0,∞) is a true martingale by verifying Novikov’s con-
dition on a small interval and then applying a similar argument to the one used in Example 3,
page 233, in Liptser and Shiryaev [23].
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Proof. Consider the process
Yit := −
∫ t
0
(ρi+γi(µ
D
0s−
1
2
(σD)2)+
1
2
δ2is)ds+(γi − 1)βixt+
∫ t
0
(δis−γiσD)dW (0)s .
The dynamics of Mit are given by
dMit
Mit
= dYit +
1
2
d〈Yi, Yi〉t.
where
dYit = −
(
ρi + γi
(
µDt −
1
2
(σD)2
)
+
1
2
δ2it
)
dt+
βi(γi − 1)(log(Dt)− xt)dt+
(
δit − γiσD
)
dW
(0)
t ,
and
d〈Yi, Yi〉t =
(
δit − γiσD
)2
dt.
The rest of the proof follows from the fact that the risk free rate and the market
price of risk coincide with minus the drift and minus the volatility of the SPD
respectively. 
3.2. Heterogeneous Economy. Consider an economy populated by N different
types of agents. By Lemma 2.1, the optimal consumption stream of agent i is given
by
(3.2) cit = e
− ρiγi tM
− 1γi
t Z
1
γi
it H
γi−1
γi
it ci0 = ci0
(
Mit
Mt
)1/γi
Dt,
where (Mt)t∈[0,∞) stands for the corresponding heterogeneous equilibrium state
price density, and Mit is given by (3.1). Therefore, the market clearing condition
(2.6) admits the form
(3.3)
N∑
i=1
ci0
(
Mit
Mt
)1/γi
= 1.
Example 3.1. Consider a homogeneous risk aversion economy, i.e., γ1 = ... =
γN = γ. Then, the equilibrium state price density is given explicitly by
Mt =
 N∑
i=1
ci0e
−ρit/γZ1/γit H
γ−1
γ
it
Dt
γ .
Furthermore, if the habits are homogeneous, that is, β1 = ... = βN = β, we have
Mt = e
(γ−1)βxt
(
N∑
i=1
ci0e
ρit/γZ
1/γ
it
Dt
)γ
.
If the beliefs among the agents are not varying, i.e., Z1t = ... = ZNt = Zt, then,
we have
Mt = Zt
 N∑
i=1
ci0e
ρit/γH
γ−1
γ
it
Dt
γ .
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Finally, we provide formulas for the risk free rate and the market price of risk.
Proposition 3.3. We have
θt =
N∑
i=1
ωitθit,
and
rt =
N∑
i=1
ωitrit +
1
2
N∑
i=1
(1 − 1/γi)ωit (θit − θt)2 ,
where
(3.4) ωit :=
1/γicit∑N
j=1 1/γjcjt
denotes the relative level of absolute risk tolerance of agent i.
Proof. The proof is identical to the one of Proposition 4.1 in Cvitanic´, Jouini,
Malamud and Napp [8]. 
4. The Main Result: The Long-Run Surviving Consumer
The current section is devoted to the study of the long-run behavior of the op-
timal consumption shares in a heterogeneous economy. We establish the existence
of a surviving consumer in the market, i.e., an agent whose optimal consumption
asymptotically behaves as the aggregate consumption. This dominating individual
is determined through the survival index. The survival index is a quantity de-
pending on individuals’ characteristics and specifies the surviving agent versus the
agents to be extinct in the economy.
Definition 4.3. The survival index of agent i is given by
(4.1) κi := ρi +
(
µ− 1
2
(σD)2
)
(γi + (1− γi)βi)+
1
2
(
µi − µ
σD
)2
+
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2
(1− φ2i )
.
The following is assumed throughout the entire paper.
Assumption. There exists an agent IK whose survival index is the lowest one,
namely κIK < κi, for all i 6= IK .
We are now ready to state our main result.
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Theorem 4.1. In equilibrium, the only surviving agent in the long-run is the one
with the lowest survival index, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
cit
Dt
= 0
for all i 6= IK , and
lim
t→∞
cIKt
Dt
= 1.
The survival index is a complicated function of the individuals’ underlying pa-
rameters. In order to isolate the effects of various agents’ characteristics on the
long-run survival, we will discuss special cases in which agents differ with respect
to only one or a few particular parameters.
4.1. The Effect of Risk-Aversion and Habits. Let the initial priors (µi)i=1,...,N
and the over-confidence parameters (φi)i=1,...,N be fixed and identical for all agents.
As it will be seen in the proof of Theorem 4.1, the survival index is invariant under
additive translation, and thus it is determined in the current setting by
ρi +
(
µ− (σ
D)2
2
)
(γi + (1− γi)βi).
If β1 = ... = βN = 0, the survival index is the same as in Cvitanic´, Jouini, Malamud
and Napp [8]. In particular, in a growing economy (i.e. µ− (σD)2/2 > 0), the least
risk-averse agent will survive in the long-run, as in the models of Yan [32], and
Cvitanic´, Jouini, Malamud and Napp [8]. The presence of habits may change the
behavior. Here, if the habit is sufficiently strong (βi > 1), the effect completely
reverses: It is the most risk-averse agent who survives in the long-run. Effectively,
’catching up with Joneses’ preferences change an agent’s risk aversion from γi to
(4.2) γi + (1− γi)βi.
Therefore, for strong habits, agents with a high risk-aversion effectively behave as
agents with a low risk aversion. When risk aversion is homogeneous, the effect of
habits strength on survival depends on whether risk aversion is above or below 1.
If risk aversion is above 1, we get the surprising, and at first sight counter-intuitive
result, that agents with stronger habits survive in the long-run. The reason for this
is that the presence of habits forces the agent to trade more aggressively and make
bets on very good realizations of the dividend in order to sustain the aggregate
habit level generated by the ’catching up with the Joneses’ preferences. This makes
an agent with strong habits effectively less risk averse. This is beneficial for survival
in a growing economy.
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4.2. The Effect of Diverse Beliefs. Consider an economy where agents may
differ only with respect to their average mean growth-rate estimations (µi)i=1,...,N
and their correlation parameters (φi)i=1,...,N . In this case, the survival index admits
the form
(4.3) κi =
1
2
(
µi − µ
σD
)2
+
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2
(1− φ2i )
.
Note that in this case the survival index is a decreasing function of the correlation
parameter φi in the interval [−1, φ], and an increasing function in the interval
(φ, 1]. Therefore, in an economy where the only distinction between agents is their
correlation parameters, the surviving agent is derived as follows. If either all agents
are over-confident (φ < φi, for all i = 1, ..., N) or under-confident (φ > φi, for all
i = 1, ..., N), then the survival index is given by
|φi − φ| ,
and thus, the individual with the most accurate guess of the correct correlation
will dominate the market. If some agents are over-confident and some are under-
confident in the signal, the situation becomes more complex. For simplicity, let
us analyze the case of an economy which consists of two agents: the first agent
underestimates the correlation and believes that it is φ1 ∈ [−1, φ], whereas the
second agent overestimates the correlation by φ2 ∈ [φ, 1]. Let us set a :=
(
ξσD
σµ
)2
.
If φ1 ∈
[
−1, 2 aφ(1+a)
aφ2+(a+1−φ)2 − 1
]
, the second agent will survive. Now, assume that
φ1 ∈
[
2 aφ(1+a)
aφ2+(a+1−φ)2 − 1, φ
]
. Then, if φ2 ∈
[
φ,
2(a+1)φ−(a+1+φ2)φ1
a+1+φ2−2φφ1
]
, the second
agent will survive; otherwise, namely, if φ2 ∈
[
2(a+1)φ−(a+1+φ2)φ1
a+1+φ2−2φφ1 , 1
]
, the first
agent will survive. To demonstrate the above scheme numerically, let us consider
the case where a = 1 and φ = 1/2 (see Figure 1). If φ1 ∈ [−1,−0.2], then the second
agent will survive. If φ1 ∈ [−0.2, 0.5] , then: if φ2 ∈
[
0.5, 8−9φ19−4φ1
]
, the second agent
is the one to survive. Otherwise, if φ2 ∈
[
8−9φ1
9−4φ1 , 1
]
then the first agent will survive.
The preceding fact yields an economically surprising observation: too overconfident
agents will not survive when they compete with agents that believe in a weak
negative correlation. Assume, for instance, that the second agent believes that the
correlation is some φ2 ∈ [8/9, 1]. Then, if φ1 ∈ [ 8−9φ29−4φ2 , 0], the first agent will survive,
despite of the negative correlation. This is very surprising, since irrational agents
who believe in a non-positive correlation happen to survive, whereas individuals
with an overestimation of the signal will be extinct.
If the only source of heterogeneity in the economy is the belief regarding the av-
erage mean growth-rate, then the survival index depends only on the error between
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First agent survives
Second agent survives
φ1 =
8−9φ2
9−4φ2
Figure 1. The long-run surviving consumer
the subjective mean growth-rate and the correct one, namely,
κi = |µ− µi| .
Therefore, the consumer with the best forecast of the average mean growth-rate is
the one to dominate the market.
4.3. The Relative Level of Absolute Risk Tolerance. As in Cvitanic´, Jouini,
Malamud and Napp [8], we define the relative level of absolute risk tolerance of
agent i by
wit :=
1/γicit∑N
j=1 1/γjcjt
.
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.1. We have
lim
t→∞
wit = 0
for all i 6= Ik, and
lim
t→∞
wIK t = 1.
Proof. Note that (3.2) implies that
wit =
cit
Dt
1/γi∑N
j=1 1/γjc0j(Mjt/Mt)
1/γj
.
The identity (3.3) yields
1∑N
j=1
1
γj
c0j(Mjt/Mt)1/γj
≤ max
k=1,...,N
γk.
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The preceding observations combined with Theorem 4.1 and the equality
∑N
i=1 ωit =
1 complete the proof of Corollary 4.1. 
5. Auxiliary Results
In the present section we provide some results that will be crucial for proving
Theorem 4.1. First, we introduce the following estimates, indicating that yit, 1/yit,
their derivatives, and νit are close to certain functions, of a simpler form. The errors
in these estimates are shown to be decaying exponentially fast to 0, as t→∞.
Lemma 5.3. We have
(5.1)
∣∣νit − αi2(σD)2∣∣ ≤ Ce−2(αi2+ξ)t,
(5.2)
∣∣∣∣yit − exp(−αi2αi1 e−αi2αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Ce−(αi2+ξ)t,
(5.3)
∣∣∣∣y′it − (αi2 + ξ) exp(−αi2αi1 e−αi2αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Ce−(αi2+ξ)t
and
(5.4)
∣∣∣∣ 1yit − exp
(
αi2
αi1
e
−αi2αi1
)
e−(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Ce−3(αi2+ξ)t,
(5.5)
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
yit
)′
+ (αi2 + ξ) exp
(
αi2
αi1
e
−αi2αi1
)
e−(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Ce−3(αi2+ξ)t,
for all t > 0 and some constant C > 0.
Proof. Inequality (5.1) is due to the fact that
∣∣νit − αi2(σD)2∣∣ = ∣∣∣ (αi1−αi2)αi2(σD)2αi1e2(αi2+ξ)t−αi2 ∣∣∣ .
Next, by definition (see Proposition 2.2), it follows that yit admits the form
yit = exp
(
(αi2 + ξ) t− αi2
αi1
e
−αi2αi1
(
1− e−2(αi2+ξ)t
))
.
One checks that the inequality ex − 1 ≤ (e − 1)x, for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 concludes the
validity of (5.2). Recall that yit satisfies the ODE y
′
it =
(
ξ + νit(σD)2
)
yit, and thus
we can estimate ∣∣∣∣y′it − (αi2 + ξ) exp(−αi2αi1 e−αi2αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ ≤
exp
(
−αi2
αi1
e
−αi2αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ νit(σD)2 − αi2
∣∣∣∣+(
ξ +
νit
(σD)2
) ∣∣∣∣yit − exp(−αi2αi1 e−αi2αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t
∣∣∣∣ ,
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which implies (5.3) by applying inequalities (5.1) with (5.2). Inequalities (5.4) and
(5.5) are proved in a similar manner. 
For each d ≥ 1, we denote by (C0 ([0, 1];Rd) , || · ||∞) the space of all Rd-valued
continuous functions on the interval [0, 1] vanishing at 0 endowed with the sup
topology.
Definition 5.4. We denote by K(d) the space of all functions f = (f1, ..., fd) ∈
C0
(
[0, 1];Rd
)
, such that each component fi is absolutely continuous, and
d∑
i=1
∫ T
0
(f ′i(x))
2dx ≤ 1.
We note that K(d) is a compact subset of C0
(
[0, 1];Rd
)
(see Proposition 2.7,
page 343, in Revuz and Yor [26]). The next result deals with the asymptotics of
certain multiple stochastic integrals.
Lemma 5.4. Let (Wt)t∈[0,∞) and (Bt)t∈[0,∞) be two arbitrary standard Brownian
motions and denote Zt =
∫ t
0 e
−sW 1
2 (e
2s−1)dBs. Then, we have
(i)
〈Z〉∞ := lim
t→∞〈Z〉t =∞.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−as
∫ s
0
eaudWudBs
t
= 0,
for any a > 0.
(iii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(a+b)s
∫ s
0
eau
∫ u
0
ebxdWxdudBs
t
= 0,
for all a, b > 0.
Proof. (i) First, note that a change of variable implies that 〈Z〉t =
∫ t
0 e
−2s
(
W 1
2 (e
2s−1)
)2
ds =∫ 1
2 (e
2t−1)
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du. Consider the functional F : C0 ([0, 1];R)→ R+, which is given
by
F (f) :=
∫ 1
0
f2(x)
(1 + x)2
dx.
Note that F is a continuous functional. Indeed, for a fixed f ∈ C0 ([0, 1];R) and
all ε > 0, let δ = ε(2||f ||∞ + ε) and observe that ||f − g||∞ < δ for some g ∈
C0 ([0, 1];R), implies |F (f) − F (g)| < ε. It follows by Strassen’s functional law of
iterated logarithm (see Theorem 2.12, page 346, in Revuz and Yor [26]) that P-a.s
lim sup
N→∞
F
(
1√
2N log log(N)
WNt
)
= sup
h∈K(1)
F (h).
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Notice that suph∈K(1) F (h) ≥ F (h˜) > 0, where h˜(x) = x. Therefore, we have
lim sup
N→∞
F
(
1√
2N log log(N)
WNt
)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ 1
0
WNt
(1+t)2 dt
2N log logN
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(N+u)2 du
2 log log(N)
> 0.
Furthermore,
lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du
2 log log(N)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(N+u)2 du
2 log log(N)
> 0.
In particular, it follows that lim supN→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du =∞, but, since the function∫ N
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du is monotone increasing in N , it follows that limN→∞
∫ N
0
W 2u
(1+u)2 du =
∞. This accomplishes the proof of part (i).
(ii) Denote Yt =
∫ t
0 e
−s ∫ s
0 e
udWudBs and Xs =
∫ s
0 e
udWu. Note that 〈X〉t =
1
2
(
e2t − 1). Since Xt is a martingale vanishing at 0 and 〈X〉∞ = ∞, it follows by
the Dambis, Dubins-Schwartz theorem (shortly DDS, see Theorem 1.6, page 181,
in Revuz and Yor [26]) that Xt = W˜ 1
2 (e
2t−1), for a certain Brownian motion W˜t.
Therefore, we can rewrite
Yt =
∫ t
0
e−sW˜ 1
2 (e
2s−1)dBs,
and thus by part (i), we have limt→∞〈Y 〉t = 〈Y 〉∞ = ∞. It follows from the DDS
theorem that Yt = B˜〈Y 〉t , for some Brownian motion B˜t. Now, denote φ(x) =√
2x log log x and rewrite Ytt =
B˜〈Y 〉t
φ(〈Y 〉t)
φ(〈Y 〉t)
t . By the law of iterated logarithm,
we have lim supt→∞
|B˜〈Y 〉t |
φ(〈Y 〉t) ≤ 1, and hence it is enough to concentrate on the
asymptotics of the second term:
φ (〈Y 〉t)
t
=
√√√√√
2
∫ t
0
e−2s
(
W˜ 1
2 (e
2t−1)
)2
ds log log
(∫ t
0
e−2s
(
W˜ 1
2 (e
2t−1)
)2
ds
)
t2
.
Note that φ(12 (e
2s−1)) ≤ es√log 2s and thus, the law of iterated logarithm implies
that
lim sup
t→∞
φ (〈Y 〉t)
t
≤ lim sup
t→∞
√
log(2t) log log(t log 2t)
t
= 0.
This accomplishes the proof of part (ii).
(iii) By Fubini’s theorem, we have
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au
∫ u
0 e
bxdWxdudBs
t
=
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
bxdWxdBs
t
− 1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a+b)xdWxdBs
t
= 0,
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where the last equality follows by part (ii). This completes the proof of Lemma
5.4. 
We proceed with the following statement.
Lemma 5.5. Let (Wt)t∈[0,∞) be a standard Brownian motion. Then, we have
(i)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
axdWxds
t
= 0
for all a > 0.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
au
∫ u
0 e
bxdWxduds
t
= 0
for all a, b > 0.
Proof. (i) By using integration by parts and Fubini’s theorem, we get
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−as
∫ s
0
eaudWuds
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
Ws − ae−as
∫ s
0
eauWudu
)
ds
t
=
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
Wsds− a
∫ t
0
(
eauWu
∫ t
u
e−asds
)
du
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
auWudu
teat
= 0,
where the last equality follows by the law of large numbers.
(ii) As in (i), one checks that the limit is equal to
1
a
lim
t→∞
(∫ t
0
e−bs
∫ s
0
ebxdWxds−
∫ t
0
e−(a+b)s
∫ s
0
e(a+b)xdWxds
)
,
which vanishes according to (i). 
In the next limit theorems, the main tool is ergodicity of certain stochastic pro-
cesses. Similar ideas as below (even though we have provided a direct argument)
could be applicable to deduce the previous lemma.
Lemma 5.6. Let (Wt)t∈[0,∞) and (Bt)t∈[0,∞) be two independent Brownian mo-
tions. Then, the following holds
(i)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−as ∫ s
0 e
axdWxe
−bs ∫ s
0 e
bxdBxds
t
= 0
for all a, b > 0.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−as
∫ s
0 e
axdWx
)2
ds
t
=
1
2a
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for all a > 0.
(iii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
axdWx
∫ s
0 e
bxdWxds
t
=
1
a+ b
for all a, b > 0.
Proof. (i) First observe that
∫ s
0
eaxdWx is a martingale with 〈
∫ ·
0
eaxdWx〉t =
e2at−1
2a , and thus by the DDS theorem, we have
∫ t
0 e
axdWx = W˜ e2at−1
2a
for some
Brownianmotion (W˜t)t∈[0,∞). A similar argument implies that
∫ t
0
ebxdBx = B˜ e2bt−1
2b
for a Brownian motion (B˜t)t∈[0,∞). The construction in the DDS theorem im-
plies that (B˜t)t∈[0,∞) and (B˜t)t∈[0,∞) are independent. Recall that e−atW˜e2at and
e−btB˜e2bt are two independent stationary Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, thus the
process e−(a+b)tW˜e2at B˜e2bt is stationary. Therefore, an ergodic theorem for station-
ary processes implies that
(5.6) lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)sW˜e2as B˜e2bsds
t
= e−(a+b)E
[
W˜e2aB˜e2b
]
= 0.
Next, the process (W ′t )t∈[0,∞) given by W
′
t =
√
2aW˜ t
2a
for t < 1, and W ′t =√
2aW˜ t−1
2a
+
√
2aW˜ 1
2a
for t > 1 is a Brownian motion. Thus, we have W˜ e2as−1
2a
=
1√
2a
W ′e2as − W˜ 12a , for all s > 1. We define the process (B′t)t∈[0,∞) in a similar man-
ner. We emphasize that (W ′t )t∈[0,∞) and (W˜t)t∈[0,∞) are independent of (B
′
t)t∈[0,∞)
and (B˜t)t∈[0,∞). Thus we can rewrite (5.6) as
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(a+b)s
(
1√
2a
W ′e2as − W˜ 12a
)(
1√
2b
B′e2bs − B˜ 12a
)
ds
t
.
Next, the law of iterated logarithm implies that for every ε > 0 there exists an
F∞-measurable random variable N(ε) : Ω → R+ such that for all s > N(ε),∣∣∣ We2as
eas
√
log(2as)
∣∣∣ < 1 + ε, and hence
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
∣∣e−as−bsW ′e2as ∣∣ ds
t
≤ (1 + ε) lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
log(as)
ebs ds
t
= 0.
This fact combined with (5.6) accomplishes the proof of part (i).
(ii) As in (i),
∫ s
0 e
axdWx = W˜ e2as−1
2a
and W˜ e2as−1
2a
= 1√
2a
W ′e2as − W˜ 12a . Next,
ergodicity yields
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−asW˜e2as
)2
ds
t
=
1
e2a
E
[
W˜ 2e2a
]
= 1.
Finally, the above limit combined with similar arguments to those appearing in (i)
concludes the proof.
(iii) The idea of the proof is to rewrite the required limit in terms of limits of the
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same form as those in (ii). First, observe that e−at
∫ s
0
eaudWu =Ws−ae−at
∫ s
0
eauWudu.
Thus we can rewrite,
(5.7)
∫ t
0
(
e−as
∫ s
0
eaudWu
)2
ds
=
∫ t
0
W 2s ds− 2a
∫ t
0
e−asWs
∫ s
0
eauWududs+ a
2
∫ t
0
e−2as
(∫ s
0
eauWudu
)2
du.
Observe that Fubini’s theorem implies that
(5.8)
∫ t
0
e−2as
(∫ s
0
eauWudu
)2
du =
∫ t
0
∫ t
0
eax+ayWxWy
∫ t
max{x,y}
e−2asdsdxdy
=
1
a
∫ t
0
e−asWs
∫ s
0
eauWududs− 1
2ae2at
(∫ t
0
Wxe
axdx
)2
.
This fact alongside (5.7) and (5.8) implies that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−at
∫ s
0
eaudWu
)2
ds
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 W
2
s ds− a
∫ t
0 e
−asWs
∫ s
0 e
auWududs− a2e2at
(∫ t
0 e
asWsds
)2
t
.
By using similar arguments and exploiting the preceding observations, one can
check that
(5.9) lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
axdWx
∫ s
0 e
bxdWxds
t
=
a
a+ b
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
W 2s ds− a
∫ t
0
e−asWs
∫ s
0
eauWududs+
a
2e2at
(∫ t
0
easWsds
)2
t
+
b
a+ b
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
W 2s ds− b
∫ t
0
e−asWs
∫ s
0
eauWududs+
a
2e2at
(∫ t
0
easWsds
)2
t
.
The latter fact combined with part (ii) completes the proof. 
The next statement is heavily based on the previous lemma.
Lemma 5.7. Let (Wt)t∈[0,∞) and (Bt)t∈[0,∞) be two independent Brownian mo-
tions. Then, we have
(i)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−(a+b)s
∫ s
0
eax
∫ x
0
ebudWudx
)2
ds
t
=
1
2b(a+ b)(a+ 2b)
for all a, b > 0.
(ii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(2a+b)s
∫ s
0
eaudWu
∫ s
0
ebu
∫ u
0
eaxdWxduds
t
=
1
2a(2a+ b)
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for all a, b > 0.
(iii)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(a+b)s
∫ s
0
e(a−ξ)u
∫ u
0
eξudWxdu
∫ s
0
e(b−ξ)u
∫ u
0
eξudWxduds
t
=
1
(a− ξ)(b − ξ)
(
1
a+ b
+
1
2ξ
− 1
a+ ξ
− 1
b+ ξ
)
for all a, b, ξ > 0.
(iv)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−2(a+b)s
∫ s
0
eay
∫ y
0
ebudWudy
∫ s
0
e(a+b)xdWxds
t
=
1
2(a+ b)(a+ 2b)
for all a, b, ξ > 0.
(iv)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−2(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
ay
∫ y
0 e
budWudy
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)xdWxds
t
=
1
2(a+ b)(a+ 2b)
for all a, b > 0.
(v)
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−2(a+b)s
∫ s
0
eay
∫ y
0
ebudWudy
∫ s
0
e(a+b)xdBxds
t
= 0
for all a, b > 0.
Proof. (i) Notice that
∫ s
0
eax
∫ x
0
ebudWudx =
1
a
∫ s
0
ebu(eas−eau)dWu. Therefore,
the required limit is equal to
1
a2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−bs
∫ s
0
ebudWu
)2
ds
t
− 2
a2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(a+2b)s
∫ s
0
e(a+b)udWu
∫ s
0
ebudWuds
t
+
1
a2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−(a+b)s
∫ s
0
e(a+b)udWu
)2
ds
t
.
Parts (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 5.6 complete the proof of (i).
(ii) As before, one checks that the limit is equal to
1
b
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−2as
(∫ s
0
eaxdWx
)2
ds
t
−1
b
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(2a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
audWu
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)xdWxds
t
,
and the rest is a consequence of parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.6.
(iii) The limit is equal to
1
(a− ξ)(b − ξ)
(
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
e−au
∫ u
0 e
axdWx
)2
du +
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)u ∫ u
0 e
axdWx
∫ u
0 e
bxdWxdu
t
− lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(a+ξ)u
∫ u
0
eξxdWx
∫ u
0
eaxdWxdu+
∫ t
0
e−(b+ξ)u
∫ u
0
eξxdWx
∫ u
0
ebxdWxdu
t
)
.
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The rest follows by applying items (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.6.
(iv) One checks that the required limit is equal to
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(2a+b)s
∫ s
0
ebudWu
∫ s
0
e(a+b)xdWxds
t
+
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(a+b)s (∫ s
0 e
(a+b)udWu
)2
ds
t
,
and the follows by parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 5.6.
(v) As in (i), one checks that the limit is equal to
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(2a+b)s
∫ s
0
ebudWu
∫ s
0
e(a+b)xdBxds
t
−
1
a
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−2(a+b)s ∫ s
0 e
(a+b)udWu
∫ s
0 e
(a+b)xdBxds
t
,
which vanishes due to part (i) of Lemma 5.6. 
6. Proof of The Main Result
We provide here a proof for Theorem 4.1. Fix an arbitrary i 6= IK . Recall that∑N
j=1 cjt = Dt, and thus it suffices to show that limt→∞
cit
Dt
= 0. Note that (3.3)
implies that Mt ≥ cγIKIK0 ·MIKt. Therefore, identity (3.2) yields
cit
Dt
= c0i
(
Mit
Mt
)1/γi
≤ ci0
c
γIK /γi
IK0
(
Mit
MIKt
)1/γi
.
In virtue of identity (3.1), we have
Mit
MIKt
= exp (ai(t)− aIK (t)) ,
where
aj(t) := (γj − 1)βjxt +
(
(σD)2
2
γj − ρj
)
t+
∫ t
0
(
−γjµDs −
δ2js
2
)
ds+
∫ t
0
δjsdW
(0)
s − γjσDW (1)t ,
for all j = 1, ..., N. Therefore, in order to complete the proof of the statement, it
suffices to show that
lim
t→∞
ai(t)− aIK (t)
t
= κIK − κi < 0.
To this end, we proceed with the computation of the following limits.
Part I. We claim that
(6.1) lim
t→∞
xt
t
= µ− 1
2
(σD)2.
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Recall that by (2.5) and (2.2), we have
lim
t→∞
xt
t
= lim
t→∞
x0 + λ
∫ t
0
eλs
(∫ s
0
µDu du− 12 (σD)2s+ σDW
(1)
s
)
ds
teλt
.
Note that the law of large numbers implies that limt→∞
∫
t
0
eλsW (1)s ds
teλt = 0. Next, it
is evident that limt→∞ x0teλt = 0 and limt→∞
∫ t
0
seλsds
teλt
= 1/λ. Let us show that
(6.2) lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
µDu du
t
= µ.
By (2.4), we get
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
µDu du
t
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
µ+ (µ0 − µ) e−ξs + σµ
∫ s
0 e
ξ(u−s)dW (2)u
)
ds
t
.
Clearly, we have limt→∞
∫ t
0 (µ+(µ0−µ)e−ξs)ds
t = µ. Furthermore, part (i) of Lemma
5.5 yields limt→∞
∫ t
0
∫ s
0
eξ(u−s)dW (2)u ds
t = 0. This asserts the validity of (6.2). Next,
by L’hoˆpital’s rule, we get
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
λs
∫ s
0 µ
D
u duds
teλt
= lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 µ
D
s ds
λt+ 1
=
µ
λ
,
proving (6.1).
Part II. We claim that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 (δIKs − δis) dW
(1)
s
t
= 0.
By definition (see (2.14)), it suffices to verify that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 µ
D
jsdW
(1)
s
t
= 0
holds for all j = 1, ..., N. It is not hard to check by employing Lemma 5.3 combined
with the law of large numbers, that the preceding limit does not change when the
functions yiu,
1
yiu
and νiu are substituted by e
(αi2+ξ)t, e−(αi2+ξ)t and αi2(σD)2,
respectively. In view of the latter observation, by definition (see (2.10)), we need
to show that
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
(µi − µ)
(
1− e−ξs)+ (µ0i − µ0) e−ξs + ξµiξ+αi2 (1− e−(ξ+αi2)s)) dW (1)s
t
+αi2 lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
e−(ξ+αi2)s
∫ s
0
e(ξ+αi2)u
(
µ+ (µ0 − µ) e−ξu
)
dudW
(1)
s
t
+αi2σ
µ lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(ξ+αi2)s ∫ s
0 e
αi2u
∫ u
0 e
ξxdW
(2)
x dudW
(1)
s
t
+σµφi lim
t→∞
∫ t
0 e
−(ξ+αi2)s ∫ s
0 e
(ξ+αi2)udsudW
(1)
s
t
= 0.
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One checks that the first two terms vanish by the law of large numbers. The third
and fourth limits vanish by part (iii) and (ii) of Lemma 5.4, respectively. This
completes the proof of the second part.
Part III. We have,
1
2
lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
(
δ2is − δ2IKs
)
ds
t
=
1
2
(
µi − µ
σD
)2
+
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2
(1− φ2i )
−1
2
(
µIK − µ
σD
)2
− ξ
2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2 (
1− φ2IK
) .
This can be derived by applying Lemmata 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. The proof is now
accomplished by combining the above three parts, some routine algebraic transfor-
mations and the law of large numbers. 
7. Interest Rate and Market Price of Risk: Further Long-Run
Results
The current section deals with asymptotic results for the interest rate and the
market price of risk in heterogeneous economies. More precisely, it is shown that
asymptotically, the latter parameters behave as those associated with a homoge-
neous economy populated by the dominating consumer. Under some mild con-
ditions, we prove that the distance between these parameters in a heterogeneous
economy and those associated with any of the non-dominating consumer homoge-
neous economies, becomes unbounded as time goes to infinity.
7.1. Market Price of Risk. The next statement provides a full characterization
of the market price of risk asymptotics in heterogeneous economies.
Theorem 7.2. (i) We have
lim
t→∞
|θt − θIK t| = 0.
(ii) If φi = φIK for some i 6= IK , then
lim
t→∞
(θt − θit) = σD (γIK − γi)−
1
σD
(
µIK − µi
)
.
If φi (for some i 6= IK) is such that
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2
(1− φ2i )
6= ξ
2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2 (
1− φ2IK
) ,
then
lim sup
t→∞
|θt − θit| =∞.
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Proof. (i) First, we shall prove that limt→∞ ωitθit = 0, for all i 6= IK . As in Sec-
tion 5, the DDS theorem implies the existence of a Brownian motion
(
B˜(t)
)
t∈[0,∞)
such that
e−at
∫ t
0
easdBs = e
−atB˜
(
e2at − 1
2a
)
,
where a > 0 is some constant and (Bt)t∈[0,∞) is a Brownian motion. By exploiting
the preceding fact, one checks that limt→∞
µDit√
log t
< ∞, for all i = 0, ..., N, which
implies that
(7.1) lim sup
t→∞
θjt√
log t
<∞
for all j = 1, ..., N. On the other hand, it was shown in Theorem 4.1 that ωit ≤
cit
Dt
maxi=1,...,N γi and all i 6= IK . We have in particular proved in Section 6 that
cit
Dt
≤ e−ait, for some ai > 0, for all i 6= IK . This implies that
(7.2) ωit ≤ e−ait max
i=1,...,N
γi
holds for all i 6= IK , and thus, by (7.1), we have ωitθit ≤ e−a′it for all i 6= IK , and
some constant a′i > 0. Therefore, by Proposition 3.3, we have
(7.3) |θt − ωIKtθIKt| =
N∑
i=1,i6=IK
ωitθit ≤
N∑
i=1,i6=IK
e−a
′
it.
Finally, observe that |θt − θIK t| ≤ |θt − ωIK tθIK t|+
∑N
i=1,i6=IK ωitθIKt, since
∑N
i=1 ωit =
1. The proof of part (i) follows from (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3).
(ii) If φi = φIK , by part (i) we can substitute θT by θIKT . The assertion follows by
noting that
lim
t→∞
|θIK t − θit| = lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣σD (γi − γIK ) + 1σD (µIK t − µit)
∣∣∣∣ .
Assume now that
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2
(1− φ2i )
6= ξ
2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2 (
1− φ2IK
) .
By part (i), the claim is equivalent to proving that
(7.4) lim sup
t→∞
|µDIK t − µDit | =∞.
First, one checks by employing Lemma 5.3 that the limit (7.4) does not change
when substituting νit, yit and
1
yit
by αi2(σ
D)2, exp
(
−αi2αi1 e
−αi2αi1
)
e(αi2+ξ)t and
exp
(
αi2
αi1
e
−αi2αi1
)
e−(αi2+ξ)t, respectively. Next, note that Fubini’s theorem yields
αi2
e(ξ+αi2)T
∫ T
0
eαi2u
∫ u
0
eξxdW (2)x du =
1
eξT
∫ T
0
eξudW (2)u −
1
e(αi2+ξ)T
∫ T
0
e(αi2+ξ)udW (2)u .
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By exploiting the latter observations and the DDS theorem, one checks that
lim sup
t→∞
∣∣µDit − µDIkt∣∣ = lim sup
t→∞
|fi(t)− fIk(t)| ,
where
fi(t) =
1√
(αi2 + ξ) t
(
σDαi2B
i1(t)− σµ (φφi − 1)Bi2(t) + σµφi
√
1− φ2Bi3(t)
)
.
Here, Bi1(t), Bi2(t) and Bi3(t) denote three independent Brownian motions. By
applying the DDS Theorem again, we can rewrite
(7.5) fi(t) =
1√
(αi2 + ξ) t
B(i) (lit) ,
where B(i)(t) is a Brownian motion, and
li =
(
σDαi2
)2
+ (σµ)
2
(1− φφi)2 + (σµφi)2
(
1− φ2) .
Lastly, one checks that lim supt→∞ |fi(t)− fIk(t)| =∞ by using the law of iterated
logarithm and (7.5), combined with the fact that liαi2+ξ = −2ξσD+2(σD)2
ξ2+(σµ/σD)
2
(1−φφi)
2
√
ξ2+(σµ/σD)2(1−φ2i )
.
This completes the proof of Theorem 7.2. 
7.2. Interest Rate. Analogously to Theorem 7.2, we analyze in the next statement
the asymptotics of the interest rate in heterogeneous economies.
Theorem 7.3. (i) We have
lim
t→∞ |rt − rIK t| = 0.
(ii) If γi = γIK , βi = βIK and φi = φIK for some i 6= IK , then
lim
t→∞
(rt − rit) = ρIK − ρi + γIK
(
µIK − µi
)
.
If at least one of the conditions: γi = γIK , βi = βIK and
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφi)
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2
(1− φ2i )
=
ξ2 +
(
σµ/σD
)2
(1− φφIK )
2
√
ξ2 + (σµ/σD)
2 (
1− φ2IK
)
does not hold, for some i 6= IK , then
lim sup
t→∞
|rt − rit| =∞.
Proof. (i) By definition, we have
rt − ωitrit =
N∑
j=1,j 6=IK
ωjtrjt +
1
2
N∑
j=1
(1 − 1/γj)ωjt (θjt − θt)2
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for all i = 1, ..., N. We start by treating the second term. Observe that Theorem
4.1, part (i) of Theorem 7.2, (7.4) and (7.2), imply that
N∑
j=1
(1− 1/γj)ωjt (θjt − θt)2 ≤ e−a
′t
for some constant a′ > 0. Next, note that (7.2) yields
N∑
j=1,j 6=IK
|ωjtrjt| ≤
N∑
j=1,j 6=IK
e−ajt |rjt| .
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, one can check that lim supt→∞
rjt
t < ∞ for all
j = 1, ..., N , and thus we conclude that
|rt − ωIKtrIK t| ≤ e−a
′t
for some constant a′ > 0. Finally, the proof of item (i) is accomplished by employing
the inequality |rt − rIK t| ≤ |rt −ωIKtrIK t|+ rIK t|1−ωIK t|, combined with the fact
that 1 =
∑N
j=1 ωjt, (7.2) and the fact that lim supt→∞
rjt
t <∞ for all j = 1, ..., N .
(ii) If φi = φIK , γi = γIK and βi = βIK for some i 6= IK , the claim follows by
combining part (i) with the fact that
|rit − rIK t| =
∣∣ρIK − ρi + γIK (µDIK t − µDit )∣∣ .
Now, if at least one of the indicated conditions fails for some i 6= IK , the proof is
in the same spirit as the one of item (ii) of Theorem 7.2. The only distinction is as
follows. If λ = ξ, one can check that the problem can be reduced to proving that
(7.6) lim sup
t→∞
e−λt
(
σD
∫ t
0
eλudW (1)u +
∫ t
0
∫ s
0
eλudW (2)u ds
)
=∞.
If λ = 0, we need to prove that
lim sup
t→∞
(
σDW
(1)
t +
∫ t
0
W (2)s ds
)
=∞.
Let G : C0 ([0, 1];R)→ R be a functional given by G(f) =
∫ 1
0
f(x)dx. Note that G
is continuous, since |G(f)−G(g)| ≤ ||f − g||∞ holds for all f, g ∈ C0 ([0, 1];R). By
Strassen’s functional law of iterated logarithm, we have
lim sup
N→∞
G
(
1√
2N log logN
W
(2)
Nx
)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ N
0 W
(2)
u du
N3/2
√
2 log logN
= max
f∈K(1)
G(f),
where the subspace K(1) is given in Definition 5.4. Note that maxf∈K(1) G(f) ≥
G(f0) > 0, where f0(x) = x. The preceding observation combined with the fact
limt→∞
W
(1)
t
t3/2
√
log log t
= 0 asserts that (7.6) holds for λ = 0. Assume next that λ 6= 0.
By the DDS theorem, (7.6) is equivalent to
lim sup
t→∞
e−λt
(
σDB(1)
(
e2λt − 1
2λ
)
+
∫ t
0
B(2)
(
e2λs − 1
2λ
)
ds
)
=∞,
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where B(1) and B(2) denote two standard independent Brownian motions. By a
change of variables, the claim is equivalent to
(7.7) lim sup
t→∞
1√
t
(
σDB(1)(t) +
∫ t
0
B(2)(u)
1 + 2λu
du
)
=∞.
The law of iterated logarithm yields limt→∞
∫
t
1
B(1)(u)
u(1+2λu)
du√
t
= 0, and thus (7.7) can
be rewritten as
(7.8) lim sup
t→∞
1√
t
(
σDB(1)(t) +
1
2λ
∫ t
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
=∞.
Fix some 0 < ε < 1. Consider the functional H : C0
(
[0, 1];R2
)→ R, which is given
by
H(f, g) := σDf(1) +
1
2λ
∫ 1
ε
g(u)
u
du.
Note that H is continuous, since
∣∣∣H(f, g)−H(f̂ , ĝ)∣∣∣ ≤ σD||f− f̂ ||∞− log ε2λ ||g− ĝ||∞
is satisfied for all f, g, f̂ , ĝ ∈ C0
(
[0, 1];R2
)
. Next, Strassen’s functional law of
iterated logarithm yields
lim sup
N→∞
H
(
1√
2N log logN
(
B(1)(Nt), B(2)(Nt)
))
= max
(f,g)∈K(2)
H (f, g) ,
where K(2) is introduced in Definition 5.4. Observe that max(f,g)∈K(2) H (f, g) ≥
H (h(x), h(x)) > 0, where h(x) = x. Therefore, we obtain that
(7.9) lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ(D)B(1) (N) +
1
2λ
∫ N
εN
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
> 0.
We claim next that
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ(D)B(1) (N) +
1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
> 0.
Assume towards contradiction that this is not the case. Then, Kolmogorov’s 0-1
law implies that
P
(
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ(D)B(1) (N) +
1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
> 0
)
= 0.
Therefore, by exploiting the symmetry of the Brownian motion, we obtain that
lim
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ(D)B(1) (N) +
1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
= 0,
holds P−a.s. But, since σD and λ were arbitrary, we obtain that
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
(
σ(D)B(1) (N) +
1
2λ
∫ N
εN
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
=
lim sup
N→∞
1√
2N log logN
((
σ(D) −√ε
)
B(1) (N) +
1
2λ
∫ N
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
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+B˜(1) (εN)− 1
2λ
∫ εN
1
B(2)(u)
u
du
)
= 0,
where B˜(1) (t) =
√
εB(1)
(
t
ε
)
is a Brownian motion (independent of B(2)), and ε > 0
is sufficiently small. This is a contradiction to (7.9) proving (7.7). 
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